紐時賞析／美「帝王最高院」擺官威 學者憂違權力分立

Amassing of Power By Supreme Court Alarms Scholars

美「帝王最高院」擺官威 學者憂違權力分立

The conventional critique of the Supreme Court these days is that it has lurched to the right and is out of step with the public on many issues. That is true so far as it goes.

當前對美國聯邦最高法院的批評，不外乎它已向右傾，以及在諸多議題上和社會大眾脫節，在某種程度上誠然如此。

But a burst of recent legal scholarship makes a deeper point, saying the current court is distinctive in a different way: It has rapidly been accumulating power at the expense of every other part of the government.

但近來法律學術界接連有研究提出一個更深入的觀點，認為目前的最高法院，是以一種迥異於過往的方式展現其獨特性，亦即迅速的集權，代價則是政府其他每一個部門。

The phenomenon was documented last November by Mark A. Lemley, a law professor at Stanford University, in an article called “The Imperial Supreme Court” in The Harvard Law Review.

美國史丹福大學法學教授藍姆利，上月在「哈佛法律評論」發表一篇題為「帝王最高法院」的文章，記載前述現象。

“The court has not been favoring one branch of government over another, or favoring states over the federal government, or the rights of people over governments,” Lemley wrote. “Rather, it is withdrawing power from all of them at once.”

藍姆利在文中寫道，「最高法院並未獨厚政府中的哪個部門；或偏好州政府勝於聯邦政府；或偏好人民的權利勝過各級政府」，「最高法院反而正同時將權力從這些部門中抽離」。

He added, “It is a court that is consolidating its power, systematically undercutting any branch of government, federal or state, that might threaten that power, while at the same time undercutting individual rights.”

藍姆利補充說，「最高法院正鞏固一己權力，有系統地削弱可能威脅這種權力的任何政府部門，不論聯邦或州，同時還削弱了個人權利」。

The arguments last December over the role of state legislatures in setting rules for federal elections seemed to illustrate the point. The justices seemed ready to elevate their own role in the process, giving themselves the right to do something ordinarily forbidden: second-guess state courts’ interpretations of state law.

本月針對州議會就聯邦層級選舉訂定規則的論辯，似乎闡明了上述法學界觀點。最高法院大法官們似乎準備提升他們在此一程序中的角色，賦予他們權利去做一些通常被視為禁忌之事：質疑州法院對州法的解釋。

In a similar vein, Justice Elena Kagan noted the majority’s imperial impulses in a dissent from a decision in June that limited the Environmental Protection Agency’s ability to address climate change.

以類似的態度，大法官伊蓮娜．凱根就六月最高法院一起限制美國環保署因應氣候變遷能力的判決，提出不同意見書，其中就提到多數大法官那股帝王式衝動。

“The court appoints itself — instead of Congress or the expert agency — the decision maker on climate policy,” she wrote. “I cannot think of many things more frightening.”

凱根撰文指稱，「最高法院竟委任自己為氣候政策的決策者，而非由國會或專家機構決定，我想不出還有多少事比這個更令人恐懼」。

A second study, to be published in Presidential Studies Quarterly, concentrated on cases involving the executive branch and backed up Lemley’s observations with data. Taking account of 3,660 decisions since 1937, the study found that the court led since 2005 by Chief Justice John Roberts has been “uniquely willing to check executive authority.”

另一項刊登在美國「總統研究季刊」的研究，則聚焦於涉及行政部門的判例，並藉由數據資料支持藍姆利的觀察。該研究納入自1937年以來的3660起判決，發現首席大法官羅伯茲自2005年領導最高法院以來，已「不尋常地賣力制約行政權」。

The executive branch in the Roberts court era won just 35% of the time in those cases, a rate more than 20 percentage points lower than the historical average.

在羅伯茲主持最高法院的時期，行政部門在最高法院的訴訟中只贏得35%判決，比歷史平均值低逾20個百分點。

文／Adam Liptak　譯／茅毅

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【張佑生】

美國法學界擔憂聯邦最高法院集權（擴權）的現象。美國憲法規定政府制度為立法（legislative）、行政（executive）、司法（judicial），從上游到下游，三權分立（separation of powers）、都是政府的分支（branch），監督制衡（checks and balances）是「總統制」的特色。

這與「內閣制」（The Westminster system）國家側重的「責任政府」（responsible government）截然不同。內閣制國家由國會大選多數黨組閣，總理（首相）是最高行政首長，總統（君主）是國家元首，並無實權。總統制國家的總統則身兼國家元首以及最高行政首長。

美國法學界批評最高法院破壞三權分立的原則，侵犯（at the expense of）行政、立法部門的權力，而非憲法設定，屬於事後的司法審查（judicial review）；在「最高」（supreme）前面加上imperial，也許是在諷稱「沒有最高，只有更高」。